Cherise Roundy Black v. Craig Barney : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Cherise Roundy Black v. Craig Barney : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Jay Sheen; Robinson & Sheen; Attorneys for Petitoner/Appellee/Cross Appellant.
Dean C. Andreasen; Matthew A. Steward; Clyde, Snow, Sessions, Swenson; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Cherise Roundy Black v. Craig Barney, No. 990535 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2219
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHERISE ROUNDY (BARNEY) BLACK, 
Petitioner/Appellee/ 
Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
V. CRAIG BARNEY 
Respondent/Appellant/ 
Cross Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 990535CA 
APPEAL FROM THE DIVORCE DECREE ENTERED ON 
JUNE 8, 1999, BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGE STANTON M. TAYLOR PRESIDING 
Dean C. Andreasen (3981) 
Matthew A. Steward (7637) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Appellant/Cross Appellee 
E. Jay Sheen (3749) 
Robinson & Sheen, L.L.C. 
13 66 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 273-0855 
Attorneys for 
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Am^tte 
JUL 1 0 ?0H0 
Julia D'AIasandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHERISE ROUNDY (BARNEY) BLACK, 
Petitioner/Appellee/ 
Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
V. CRAIG BARNEY 
Respondent/Appellant/ 
Cross Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 990535CA 
APPEAL FROM THE DIVORCE DECREE ENTERED ON 
JUNE 8, 1999, BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGE STANTON M. TAYLOR PRESIDING 
Dean C. Andreasen (3981) 
Matthew A. Steward (7637) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Appellant/Cross Appellee 
E. Jay Sheen (3749) 
Robinson & Sheen, L.L.C. 
13 66 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 273-0855 
Attorneys for 
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. M1. hl.kCb IAJLS TO ESTABLISH THA'l AN AWARD 
UJ NUNTLKMINABLE ALIMONY IS EQUITABLE IN 
Till!' ACT I MM 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICILN1 
FINDINGS BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL REGARDING THE CHILDREN'S NEED FOR CHILD 
SUPPORT ABOVE THE STATUTORY GUIDELINE AMOUNT 
111. JVL TRIAL COURT mN! IliJ.Rm 'I'HI IHN'lftJ l'RACT] CI 
A MARITAL ASSET 
CONCLUSION 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App 1996) 5 
Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . . 1, 2 
Openshaw v. Openshav. 12 P.2d 364 (Utah 1932) 3, 4 
Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1993) 4,5 
Peterson v. Peterson. 748 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1998) . 1, 2, 4, 5 
Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) 2 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-5 4, 6, 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 4, 5 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I . 
MS. BLACK PAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT AN AWARD 
OF NONTERMINABLE ALIMONY I S 
EQUITABLE IN THIS ACTION 
Peti t ioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Cherise Roundy (Barney) 
Black ("Ms. Black") s t a t e s t ha t "Appellant has fa i led to e s tab l i sh 
the impropriety of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s awarding Cherise permanent 
alimony." Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant ("Appellee's 
Brief") a t 10. Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee V. Craig Barney 
("Mr. Barney") does not appeal the award of permanent alimony1 to 
Ms. Black. Mr. Barney does, however, appeal the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
award of alimony tha t does not terminate upon the remarriage of Ms. 
Black ("nonterminable alimony"). Ms. Black's confusion between 
these two concepts i s r ead i ly apparent in her argument tha t 
Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) i s 
" i l l u s t r a t i v e and probative" on the issue of nonterminable alimony. 
Appel lee 's Brief a t 10. 
In Martinez, the t r i a l court entered an award of alimony for 
a period of f ive years , which was nonterminable by reason of 
remarriage for a period of th ree years . Id. a t 74. This Court 
vacated the t r i a l c o u r t ' s alimony award and instead awarded 
Permanent alimony i s an award of alimony "on a con t inu ing b a s i s " or 
"for an i n d e f i n i t e pe r iod of t i m e . " Permanent alimony may t e r m i n a t e , however, 
upon the occurrence of c e r t a i n s t a t u t o r y even ts such as a s u b s t a n t i a l m a t e r i a l 
change in c i rcumstances , dea th , remarr iage or c o h a b i t a t i o n . Utah Code Ann. § 
3 0 - 3 - 5 ( 7 - 9 ) . 
1 
"permanent alimony in the sum of $750.00 per month subject to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987)." Id. at 75. By 
making the award subject to the provisions of § 30-3-5, the award 
would terminate upon the recipient spouse's remarriage.2 The 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, relied on by this Court in 
Martinez, provided: 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon 
the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the 
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying 
alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and 
his rights are determined. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) 
(1987) 
Therefore, in Martinez. this Court took the trial court's alimony 
award, which contained a nonterminable component, and converted it 
to a longer term alimony award which did terminate upon the 
recipient spouse's remarriage. In this case, Mr. Barney is not 
appealing the permanent alimony award, but he is appealing the 
trial court's error in ordering that the award does not terminate 
if and when Ms. Black remarries. In relying on this Court's 
decision in Martinez. Ms. Black has simply confused the two 
distinct concepts of permanent alimony and nonterminable alimony. 
The plain irony of Ms. Black's reliance on this Court's opinion in 
Martinez is that this Court actually vacated the nonterminable 
In fact, the alimony award of the district court on remand in 
Martinez specifically provides that alimony terminates upon the remarriage of 
the recipient spouse. 
2 
component of the alimony award in favor of an award that terminated 
upon remarriage. 
The other defect of Ms. Black's argument regarding alimony is 
in the discussion of the parties1 standard of living during the 
marriage. Ms. Black argues that she "will need nonterminable 
alimony to allow her to maintain a standard of living more in line 
with what she became accustomed to in the marriage." Appellee's 
Brief at 14. However, the trial court found that the parties1 
standard of living was established through their irresponsible 
spending habits and could not possibly be maintained. R. 132-9, R. 
149, and R. 995, pp.41-42. Ms. Black now argues that her alimony 
should continue, despite remarriage, so that she can maintain what 
the trial court found to be a standard of living not supportable by 
the parties1 income. Ms. Black's rationale flies in the face of 
common sense. 
Finally, the award of nonterminable alimony is contrary to the 
public policy behind the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3, 
which provides that "every man shall support his wife when she is 
in need." Id. Ms. Black's new husband is now obligated to support 
her. Mr. Barney should not now have that same obligation. As the 
Utah Supreme Court noted in Openshaw v. Openshaw, 12 P. 2d 3 64 (Utah 
1932), 
it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that it is 
the duty of a husband to support his wife. Such is still 
the law of this state . . . . This duty of support does 
not end when the marriage is dissolved by a decree of 
divorce rendered at the suit of the wife for the 
3 
husband's matrimonial wrongs; but it continues so long as 
they both shall live, the wife remains unmarried and 
needs such support, and the husband is able to provide 
the same. Id. at 3 68. 
An award of alimony that does not terminate upon the remarriage of 
the recipient spouse is contrary to this fundamental legal 
principle. Ms. Black's desire to maintain a standard of living 
that the trial court found to be well beyond the parties' means 
cannot justify an award of alimony that continues beyond Ms. 
Black's remarriage. An award of nonterminable alimony in this 
action is not justified and is not equitable. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT 
FINDINGS BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL REGARDING THE CHILDREN'S NEED FOR 
CHILD SUPPORT ABOVE THE STATUTORY GUIDELINE AMOUNT 
Ms. Black next asserts that the evidence is "legion and 
undisputed that the parties had an extravagant lifestyle, lived 
beyond their means, and that the children participated in that 
lifestyle right along with the parents." Appellee's Brief at 18. 
Ms. Black argues that the parties' extravagant lifestyle is 
sufficient to justify an award of child support which exceeds the 
highest level of the statutory guidelines. Ms. Black cites this 
Court's decision in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 
1993), as providing the "accepted definition of need." Appellee's 
Brief at 18. Notably, both Ostler and Peterson v. Peterson, 748 
P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1988) (the citation omitted from Appellee's 
Brief at 18) , were decided prior to the implementation of the 
4 
statutory child support guidelines. Moreover, neither of these 
cases attempted to define "need." In Ostler, this Court vacated 
and remanded the child support award based on the failure of the 
trial court to make specific factual findings regarding child 
support and the trial court's failure to apply those factors in 
making a modified child support award. In Peterson, this Court 
reversed and remanded the trial court's award of child support 
which was based upon the unemployment income of the payor spouse. 
If a trial court awards child support at a higher level then 
that provided by the statutory child support guidelines then the 
trial court is required to make specific findings that the 
child(ren)'s needs support the award. A general reference to the 
parties extravagant lifestyle and a statement that the children 
shared in that lifestyle, which was found to be unsustainable, is 
insufficient to support a deviation from the statutory guidelines. 
"Rather a trial judge must consider and make specific findings on 
all 'appropriate and just' facts." Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d 
1006, 1014 (Utah Ct. App 1996). The trial court did not make such 
findings because no evidence was introduced, nor does any exist, 
which would support a need for child support greater than the 
statutory child support guidelines. In that no quantitative 
evidence was introduced at trial, it is impossible to marshal any 
evidence to support the trial court's vague, qualitative findings 
of fact. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE 
DENTAL PRACTICE A MARITAL ASSET 
Confusingly, Ms. Black argues that "Mr. Barney's business 
should be considered an asset of the martial estate." Appellee's 
Brief at 20. In fact, the trial court did concluded that the 
dental practice was a marital asset. In paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of 
its findings, the trial court states: 
4. The court finds that the tangible assets of the 
Respondent's dental practice are marital property. 
6. The dental equipment has a current value of 
forty thousand dollars ($40,000). This is the value 
assigned to the equipment by Respondent. 
7. The present value of the dental equipment 
assets of the dental practice should be evenly divided 
between the parties; twenty thousand ($20,000) to each 
party. 
R. 840 
The trial court specifically found that the accounts payable 
were equal in value to the accounts receivable and therefore the 
equipment constituted the only business-related asset with any 
value to be considered. R. 840. The trial court also recognized, 
correctly, that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Sorenson v. 
Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), does not permit the valuation 
of a sole practitioner's practice unless the professional has 
6 
retired and sold the practice. See id. The dental practice was 
considered a marital asset under the applicable Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Barney respectfully requests this 
Court to order that (i) Ms. Black's alimony award terminate on 
remarriage; (ii) child support be awarded at the highest statutory 
table amount; and (iii) the judgments in the amounts of $8,000.00 
and $20,000.00, entered as a part of the property division of the 
trial court, be vacated. 
DATED: July 10, 2000 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
MATTHEW A. STEWARD 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Appellant/Cross Appellee 
V. Craig Barney 
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